Suppose in an arithmetic unverse we have two predicates φ and ψ for natural numbers, satisfying a base case φ(0) → ψ(0) and an induction step that, for generic n, the hypothesis φ(n) → ψ(n) allows one to deduce φ(n + 1) → ψ(n + 1). Then it is already true in that arithmetic universe that (∀n)(φ(n) → ψ(n)). This is substantially harder than in a topos, where cartesian closedness allows one to form an exponential φ(n) → ψ(n).
Introduction
As has often been said, toposes embody two quite different ideas, under which they are considered either as generalized universes of sets or as generalized topological spaces. Our aim here is to explore the same idea when applied to arithmetic universes (see [Joy05] , [Mai10a] ) instead of toposes. The geometric structure of Grothendieck toposes -that is to say, the structure that is used to generate them when one builds classifying toposes, that is preserved by inverse image functors for geometric morphisms, and that appears in Giraud's Theorem -is the set-indexed colimits and finite limits. However, this begs the question of what are the sets that index the colimits. The speculation behind our use of arithmetic universes, mentioned already in [Vic99, section 6.1] and discussed as "Coherent type theory" in [Vic07a] , is that one might replace the arbitrary setindexed colimits by (i) finite colimits, and (ii) those colimits that can expressed internally using free algebra constructions such as the natural numbers object and existential quantification over them.
The logical heart of the analogy is seen through the classifying toposes of geometric theories. The classifying topos is, for geometric logic, the appropriate notion of classifying category (or theory category). It is built from a generic model of the theory by adjoining colimits and finite limits. (The power of "arbitrary set-indexed colimits" is seen in the fact that, when the theory itself is small, and sets themselves are taken as forming an elementary topos, the classifying topos will then already be both an arithmetic universe and an elementary topos.) The geometric morphisms between classifying toposes -given essentially by their inverse image functors as functors preserving the geometric structure of colimits and finite limits -then correspond to "continuous maps between the spaces of models of the theories", and this can be made precise in spatial cases. The objects of the classifying topos are the sheaves over the space, or, more generally, sheaves over a site.
In many cases in practice, the geometric theory can be rephrased in the form of an arithmetic type theory, and then there is a corresponding classifying AU. We think of this as the "arithmetic space" of models of the theory. AU functors, in the reverse direction, are then the maps between the arithmetic spaces. To put it another way, we define the category AS of arithmetic spaces as the opposite of the category AU of arithmetic universes. This is analogous to the definition of the category Loc of locales as the opposite of the category Fr of frames.
We should make a remark about strictness. We assume that AUs come equipped with canonical choice of AU structure (finite limits -or more precisely: pullbacks and the terminal object -, finite colimits and list objects). We distinguish between AU homomorphisms (strict, preserving the AU structure up to equality) and AU functors (non-strict, preserving the AU structure up to isomorphism). The AU extensions that we shall use are characterized up to equivalence in terms of AU functors (Section 3).
The induction principle that forms the main result of the paper (Theorem 44) is for implications φ(n) → ψ(n) where φ and ψ are predicates on the natural numbers N . (Categorically, by "predicate" we mean that φ and ψ are subobjects of N rather than -as one might expect from a propositionsas-types interpretation -arbitrary morphisms into N .) An induction proof of ∀n (φ(n) → ψ(n)) would comprise a base case φ(0) → ψ(0) and an induction step that, for generic n, assumes an induction hypothesis φ(n) → ψ(n) and proves that φ(n + 1) → ψ(n + 1). The problem arises because, since AUs are not cartesian closed in general, φ(n) → ψ(n) cannot be interpreted as a subobject of N . Instead, we adjoin the induction hypothesis (the generic n and the sequent φ(n) → ψ(n)) to generate a new AU, and ask for φ(n + 1) → ψ(n + 1) there as the induction step. The task then is to use this property of the new AU to deduce the conclusion φ ≤ ψ in the old one.
Our solution has two main stages. Stage 1 analyses the induction step and how to extract information about the original AU from it.
Somewhat remarkably, we can use classical logic and say φ(n) → ψ(n) is equivalent to ¬φ(n)∨ψ(n). However, ¬ here is not the usual Heyting negation for subobjects (which in any case cannot normally be done in an AU) but represents a passage from φ(n) considered as an open subspace to its corresponding closed subspace; and ∨ is a join in a Boolean lattice of "subspaces" (Section 5). This is directly analogous to the use of subspaces (or sublocales) in point-free topology, and a large part of our work here lies in showing analogous structure for AUs. The induction step then becomes ¬φ(n) ∨ ψ(n) ≤ ¬φ(n + 1) ∨ ψ(n + 1), and Boolean algebra manipulations allow us to eliminate the negations. Then non-trivial conservativity theorems, based on analysing (in Section 4) the concrete structure of the AUs for open and closed subspaces, allow us to transfer this conclusion from subspaces to subobjects of N in the original AU.
Stage 2 is then a new induction principle. It says that the conclusion ∀n (φ(n) → ψ(n)) can be deduced from the base case φ(0) → ψ(0) and two conditions derived from the induction step.
Boolean logic conservative over coherent logic
It is, of course, well known that Boolean logic is conservative over coherent logic, or, to put it algebraically, any distributive lattice embeds in the free Boolean algebra over it. We shall be applying this in the case where the distributive lattice is the lattice of subobjects of an object in an arithmetic universe. We now prove the well known result in a way that is adapted to our subsequent development.
In Section 5 we shall prove another conservativity result (Theorem 39), namely that, given an arithmetic universe A, the free Boolean algebra over the lattice of subobjects of 1 embeds (contravariantly) in the category of arithmetic universes under A.
Throughout, we shall understand "lattice" and "semilattice" in a bounded sense: ∧-semilattices have top , ∨-semilattices have bottom ⊥, and lattices have both.
Proposition 1 Let L be a distributive lattice. Then the free Boolean algebra over it, BA L (qua DL) , can be presented as a distributive lattice as DL L (qua DL), ¬φ (φ ∈ L) | ¬φ a Boolean complement of φ and as a meet semilattice as
Proof. The first part is well known: the set of complementable elements is a sublattice containing L and the elements ¬φ and so is the whole of the lattice. Hence the distributive lattice so presented is already a Boolean algebra, which must be freely generated by L.
For the second part, we first enlarge the generator set L ∪ {¬φ | φ ∈ L} to include joins ¬φ ∨ ψ, giving a ∨-preserving function from L op × L. We then find that the distributive lattice as presented in the first part is isomorphic to that generated by L op × L (qua join semilattice) subject to the same relations as given in the second presentation. These relations are join-stable, so by what is essentially the dual of the finitary version of Johnstone's coverage theorem (see [VT04] for a discussion of this) we obtain the meet semilattice presentation as given.
Proposition 2 Let L be a distributive lattice. Then the free Boolean algebra BA L (qua DL) is order isomorphic to F(L × L)/ ≤ where S ≤ T if for every (t 1 , t 2 ) ∈ T , and for every decomposition S = S 1 ∪ S 2 (with S 1 and S 2 both finite) we have
Meet is given by union. (Note that the cases where S 1 and S 2 intersect give us no information, for then the inequality always holds.)
Proof. First, ≤ is a preorder. For reflexivity, with (s 1 , s 2 ) ∈ S and S = S 1 ∪ S 2 , we consider which of S 1 or S 2 contains (s 1 , s 2 ). For transitivity we use induction on the length of an enumeration of T to show that if S ≤ T ≤ U then S ≤ U . For suppose S = S 1 ∪ S 2 and (u 1 , u 2 ) ∈ U . Let σ 1 = (s1,s2)∈S1 s 1 and σ 2 = (s1,s2)∈S2 s 2 , so we want
and so T ≤ {(u 1 , u 2 ∨ t 1 ), (u 1 ∧ t 2 , u 2 )}. It follows by induction that S ≤ {(u 1 , u 2 ∨ t 1 ), (u 1 ∧ t 2 , u 2 )} and hence
Combining these with t 1 ∧ σ 2 ≤ t 2 ∨ σ 1 , we obtain
It is immediate from the definition of ≤ that union provides a meet for it, so
Calculating their images in BA L (qua DL) we can use distributivity there and find
Corollary 3 A distributive lattice L order embeds in its free Boolean algebra.
Arithmetic universes
Arithmetic universes are very much the creation of André Joyal, in unpublished work from the 1970s -though see [Joy05] . The general notion was at first not clearly defined, and we shall follow [Mai10a] (which also discusses their background in some detail) in defining them as list arithmetic pretoposes.
Definition 4 A pretopos is a category equipped with finite limits, stable finite disjoint coproducts and stable effective quotients of equivalence relations. (For more detailed discussion, see, e.g., [Joh02a, A1.4.8].)
A finitely complete category has parameterized list objects (see [Mai10a] ; also [Coc90] ) if for any object A there is an object List(A) with maps r 
where α : B ×(List(A)×A) → (B ×List(A))×A is the associativity isomorphism.
An arithmetic universe (or AU) [Mai10a] is a pretopos with parameterized list objects. We assume that each arithmetic universe is equipped with a choice of its structure. For example, given two objects A, B we can choose their product and the pairing morphisms of two morphisms. Note that an AU has all coequalizers, not just the quotients of equivalence relations. This is because the list objects allow one to construct the transitive closure of any relation.
A functor between AUs is an AU functor if it preserves the AU structure (finite limits, finite colimits, list objects) non-strictly, i.e. up to isomorphism. It is a strict AU functor, or AU homomorphism, if it preserves AU structure strictly.
The following result will be useful.
Proposition 5 Let F : A → C and G : B → C be two AU functors, and let D be another AU.
1. The comma category F ↓ G is also an AU, and the projection functors π 1 : F ↓ G → A and π 2 : F ↓ G → B are both strict AU functors. 3. In (2), H is an AU functor iff both F and G are. Moreover, H is strict iff both F and G are.
4. Let F ↓∼ = G be the full subcategory of F ↓ G whose objects are those (U, f, V ) for which f is an isomorphism. Then F ↓∼ = G is an AU, its embedding into F ↓ G is a strict AU functor, and the analogues of (2) and (3) hold (with α in (2) required to be a natural isomorphism).
Proof.
(1) The result holds because the AU constructions are all covariant -this is related to the positivity of geometric logic. Recall that an object of F ↓ G is a triple (U, f, V ) where U and V are objects of A and B, and f : F (U ) → G(V ). Any construction on such triples can be done componentwise on the U s and V s, and then the morphisms f lift by covariantness.
(2) This is a general property of comma categories. F = π 1 H and G = π 2 H.
(3) The interesting direction is ⇐. For any AU construction Γ (finite limit, finite colimit or list object), the canonical morphism from F F (Γ) to GG (Γ) is unique subject to making certain diagrams commute; but those diagrams have to commute by naturality of α. It follows that the component of α at Γ agrees with that canonical morphism. The remark on strictness is now obvious.
(4) is clear. We shall be treating AUs as generalized spaces in a way analogous to that understood for Grothendieck toposes: an AU is in some sense the category of sheaves over its space. However, whereas Grothendieck toposes are all large, having all set-indexed colimits, for AUs we may conveniently restrict our attention to the small ones.
Definition 6
We write AU and AU s for the categories of small AUs and (respectively) AU functors and strict AU functors.
An arithmetic space (or AS) X is a small AU AX. A map f : X → Y between ASs is an AU functor f * : AY → AX. Thus the category AS of ASs and maps is equal to AU op .
We shall be interested in understanding AS as a "category of (generalized) spaces", and in particular we shall be interested in understanding a slice AS/X as a category of spaces "fibred over X". Typical questions, for a map f : Y → X, would be -When is f fibrewise discrete (i.e. a local homeomorphism or sheaf, hence corresponding to an object of AX)? When is it a subspace inclusion? When is it an open or closed subspace inclusion? And in all those we should like to know something about the structure of AY and the AU functor f * . This paper takes a step towards addressing those questions.
In the first question, on fibrewise discreteness, one expects the fibrewise discrete spaces over X to be equivalent to objects of AX and hence form an AU. Taylor [Tay05] has investigated the analogous question in his system of Abstract Stone Duality and shown that there too the discrete spaces (or, to be precise in his terminology, the overt discrete spaces) form an AU.
Our fundamental construction of spaces over X is to adjoin structure freely to the AU AX, and for this we use universal algebra. The theory of arithmetic universes is essentially algebraic (or cartesian). [PV07] gives a simple "quasiequational" formulation of the logic (similar to that of [CGRW95] ), as well as a simple predicative account of the initial model theorem.
In the case of AUs, we use a quasi-equational theory with two sorts, for objects and morphisms. The category structure is described using a total operator for identity morphisms and a partial operator for composition; then the finite limit structure is described with a total operators for the terminal object and unique morphisms and partial operators for pullbacks, the projection morphisms and pairing. As a quasi-equational theory, this much is described for cartesian categories in section 6.1 of [PV07] . Finite colimits are described dually. (Remember that an AU has all finite colimits even though a pretopos does not in general.) Then the properties relating colimits to limits can be expressed quasi-equationally. Finally, the list objects are described with total operators for List, r 0 and r 1 , and a partial operator for rec.
The initial model theorem then implies that AUs can be presented by generators and relations.
Definition 7 Let A be an AU, and let S specify some additional structureadditional objects, morphisms or equations. We say that a strict model of S in an AU B is a pair (F, α) where F : A → B is an AU homomorphism and α interprets the structure in S with respect to the image of F .
Note that if H : B → C is a strict AU functor, then (H · F, H · α) is a strict model in C.
For example, if U and V are objects in A and S specifies a morphism f : U → V , then a strict model in B is an AU homomorphism F together with a given morphism f :
Proposition 5 can be used to make a category of strict models of S in B. If (F, α) and (G, β) are two strict models in B, then a homomorphism between them is a strict model in B ↓ B whose two projections down to B give (F, α) and (G, β).
Definition 8 Let A be an AU, and let S specify additional structure. Then A[S] s is presented by generators corresponding to the objects and morphisms of A and of S, and relations to require that the AU structure of A is strictly preserved and the equations of S hold.
It is equipped with a strict model (I, α) of S and is characterized up to isomorphism by the universal property that for any AU B and strict S-model (F, β) in B, there is a unique strict AU functor F :
Issues of strictness
We have to take care regarding strictness (hence the s in A[T ] s ). In the algebraic approach the AU structure appears as partial operators for finite limits, finite colimits and list objects, and so the algebraic notion of homomorphism, preserving these operators, corresponds to strict AU functors. However, our structure theorems in Section 4 involve non-strict AU functors and to deal with these we shall need a non-strict version of model. In this section we show how to adjoin additional structure to give an A[S] that allows for this.
Proposition 9
The forgetful functor G 0 : AU s → Cat is monadic.
Proof. The initial model theorem for cartesian theories implies that G 0 has a left adjoint F 0 . For the rest, applying Beck's monadicity theorem, we show that G 0 reflects isomorphisms and creates G 0 -split coequalizers.
If f : A → B is an AU homomorphism such that G 0 (f ) is an isomorphism, then G 0 (f ) −1 is also an AU homomorphism. Now suppose we have a split fork of functors
where f , g and e are AU homomorphisms. ("Split fork" means that e · s = Id C , g · t = Id B and f · t = s · e.) Given an AU homomorphism h : B→D with h · f = h · g, one finds that h · s is also an AU homomorphism as required. For example, let Γ be a finite diagram in C with limit cone γ → Γ, and let s(Γ) have limit cone γ → s(Γ). Then, e being strict, we have e(γ → s(Γ)) = (γ → Γ) and so
which is a canonical limit cone. Similarly, h · s strictly preserves finite colimits and list objects.
We write (T 0 = G 0 F 0 , η 0 , µ 0 ) for the corresponding monad on Cat. We shall also generally write α : T 0 A→A for the structure morphism (an AU homomorphism) of an AU A. If f : A→B is a functor between two AUs, we write f : T 0 A→B for the AU homomorphism lifting it.
Corollary 10 A functor f : A→B between two AUs is an AU homomorphism iff f · α = f .
Proposition 11 Let f : A→B be a functor between two AUs. Then f is an AU functor iff f · α ∼ = f . In this situation there is a unique natural isomorphism whose composite with (η 0 ) A is the identity on f .
Proof. ⇐: Let Γ be a finite diagram in A, with canonical limit cone γ → Γ, and let γ → η 0 (Γ) be the canonical limit cone in T 0 A. (We are briefly writing η 0
It follows that f (γ → Γ) is a limit cone as required for non-strict preservation of finite limits. Preservation of finite colimits and list objects is similar.
⇒: Let C = f ↓∼ = f as in Proposition 5. From there we see that there is a bijection between isomorphisms f · α ∼ = f and strict AU functors H : T 0 A → C such that π 1 · H = α and π 2 · H = Id. Now let the functor H : A → C correspond to the functors Id A and η 0 , and the identity natural transformation on f . There is a unique strict AU functor H such that H = H η 0 , and this gives us our unique natural isomorphism with the required property.
Proposition 12
The subcategory inclusion G : AU s → AU is monadic.
Proof. We define its left adjoint F : AU → AU s as follows. If A is an AU, then F A is the AU defined over T 0 A by freely adjoining a natural isomorphism υ : η 0 · α ∼ = Id T0A , subject to its composing with η 0 to give the identity on η 0 . Let η : T 0 A → F A be the canonical AU homomorphism. By Proposition 11, AU functors f : A → B are in bijection with AU homomorphisms f : T 0 A → B equipped with isomorphisms υ of the kind described, and they are in bijection with AU homomorphisms F A → B. In fact, η · η 0 is a universal arrow from A to G, so we obtain a functor F left adjoint to G. (The fact that η · η 0 is an AU functor follows from Proposition 11.) The conditions for Beck's monadicity theorem are proved as in Proposition 9.
We write (T, η, µ) for the corresponding strictification monad on AU. Note that every object is a T -algebra, in a unique way -we write β : T A → A for the structure morphism, an AU homomorphism. The point is that not every morphism is a T -homomorphism.
Theorem 13 If A is an AU then the functors η and β form an equivalence A T A.
Proof. By definition, β · η = Id A . To prove η · β ∼ = Id T A we use a proof similar to that of Proposition 11. Let C be the AU η ↓∼ = T A. There is an AU functor g : A → C given by g(A) = (A, η(A), Id η(A) ). Its extension to an AU homomorphism g : T A → C provides the required natural isomorphism.
We now show how to adjoin structure in a way that allows for non-strictness, slightly modifying Definitions 7 and 8. Definition 14 Let A be an AU, and let S specify some additional structure We say that a model of S in an AU B is a pair (F, α) where F : A → B is an AU functor and α interprets the structure in S with respect to the image of F .
Just as before, Proposition 5 can be used to make a category Mod S (B) of models of S in B.
Definition 15 Let A be an AU, and let S specify additional structure. Then 
A[S]
is characterized up to strict AU isomorphism by the universal property that j · i is an isomorphism of categories.
2. j is an equivalence of categories. It is also possible to use the type theoretic methods of [Mai05a] . Though much more complex, these deal with structure of general dependent type theory and hence cover much more general kinds of adjoined structure. The basic idea is as follows.
First, given an AU A, one can make a T au -theory T iso (A) (where T au is the typed calculus of AUs) that has constants (and suitable axioms) for all the category structure of A; and also constants and axioms for coherent isomorphisms between the AU types that can be expressed in the type theory and the constants for the corresponding values in A.
It has the property that, for any AU B, the interpretations of T iso (A) in B are equivalent to AU functors A → B.
Next, if S expresses extra ingredients of type theory that we wish to adjoin to A, then we can make an extended theory T iso (A) [S] . We then write A[S] t for the syntactic category C Tiso(A) [S] , i.e. the category of ground types for T iso (A) [S] . It has the property that for any AU B, pairs (F, α) (where F : A → B is an AU functor and α is an interpretation of S in B with respect to the image of F ) are equivalent to AU functors A[S] t → B. The notion of "interpretation of S" is as described in section 5 of [Mai05a] and is highly non-trivial.
For a detailed proof of this approach, see [Mai10b] .
Some structure theorems
In this section we discuss some theorems and conjectures that describe concrete structure of certain AUs presented as A[S] (Definition 15). We feel free to use the internal language of an AU in the type-theoretic form devised in [Mai05a] . 
Discrete spaces and open subspaces
We shall prove that adjoining a global element to an object U is equivalent to working in the slice category over U . In effect, this is characterizing discrete spaces over an AS, i.e. the AS analogue of local homeomorphism. The topos analogue of this is well known, though often concealed. This also covers open subspaces.
Lemma 18 In any arithmetic universe A, List preserves equalizers.
Proof. We give an argument whose essential ingredients may be found in [Mai10a] . Let e : E → A be an equalizer of f, g : A → B, and let e L : E L → List(A) be an equalizer of List(f ) and List(g). Clearly List(e) factors via e L ; we must show the reverse, with a morphism E L → List(E).
First, note that 1
is a coproduct diagram. This follows by using the morphism
The image of r 1 is the object List * (A) of non-empty lists. Pulling back along e L we also get a coproduct diagram for E L ; let E * L be the pullback of List * (A). Next, the morphism p : N × List * (A) → A is defined so that p n (s) is the nth element of s (with suitable treatment of cases where n is out of bounds), and one can then show that it restricts to a morphism N × E * L → E. Knowing (via e L ) the length function on E L , we can then derive a morphism E * L → List * (E) and from that we obtain a morphism
It is then straightforward to show that it composes with List(e) to give e L .
Theorem 19 Let U be an object of an AU A. Then A[c : 1 → U ] is equivalent to the slice category A/U .
Proof. It is known that A/U is an arithmetic universe (see proposition 2.13 in [Mai05a] and also [Mai10a] ).
We can think of A/U as extending A via the AU functor
is a global element of π 1 : U × U → U . Therefore we get an AU-homomorphism
extending ξ and taking c to ∆ U .
Conversely, we can define a functor
sending any object f : V → U to the equalizer
We note immediately that ξ · γ ∼ = Id A/U . This is because any object f : V → U of A/U is an equalizer of the morphisms U × f, ∆ U · π 1 : U × V → U × U over U , and hence is isomorphic to ξ(γ(f )).
Next, we find γ · ξ(V ) is isomorphic to the equalizer
We shall need to show that γ is an AU functor. Let δ : A/U → A be the functor that takes each object f : V → U to V ; δ preserves finite colimits and pullback. Each finite colimit or pullback diagram Γ (including the colimit cocone or limit cone) has a terminal node h : A → U (the colimit itself, or the base of the pullback), and then the values of γ on the rest of the diagram I · δ(Γ) are obtained by pulling back along γ(h) → I(A). Since such diagrams are stable under pullback, we see that γ preserves finite colimits and pullbacks. It also preserves the terminal object Id U , because we have an equalizer
Using [Mai10a] the list object of f : V → U in A/U , let us write List U (f ), is calculated as an equalizer of two morphisms in A,
−→ List(U ), and
(Note that List (1) is N .) We define mult(n, u) to be a list of length n all of whose elements are u. More categorically, it is defined according to Definition 4 using
We can re-express the equalizer as one in A/U , namely of
−→ ξ(List(U )), and
Then, since γ preserves finite limits and γ · ξ ∼ = I, we have that γ(List U (f )) is an equalizer of
−→ I(List(U )), and
The second of these is equal to I(List(c) · I(List(!). Since I preserves List, we see that we are equalizing
−→ List(I(U )), and
Using Lemma 18 we deduce that the equalizer we seek for γ(List U (f )) is isomorphic to List(γ(f )).
Closed subspaces
Theorem 19 is a satisfactory AU version of a fundamental result from topos theory. We conjecture that there is a similarly good general result for sheaves in an AU setting, at least over spectral (coherent) spaces. If L is a distributive lattice, then the corresponding spectral space has for its frame the ideal completion of L. 2. It is equivalent to the AU got by freely adjoining to A a prime filter of L.
Specializing, the idea also applies to Stone spaces (where L is a Boolean algebra) and -the case that will interest us here and for which we give proofsclosed subspaces φ ≤ ⊥, where φ is a subobject of 1. A closed subspace is Stone over its superspace: the Boolean algebra of clopens for the closed subspace can be described as the coequalizer B φ of two maps φ → 1 → 2, where the second morphism is either of the two coproduct injections. Thus B φ has the two elements ⊥ B and B , but they are equal (giving an inconsistent theory) if φ holds.
A presheaf F over B φ is a restriction morphism F ( B ) → F (⊥ B ) that is an isomorphism if φ holds -in other words, F ( B ) × φ → F (⊥ B ) × φ is an isomorphism. The only significant effect of the sheaf pasting conditions is that F (⊥ B ) must be a singleton. Hence a finitary sheaf is determined by F ( B ), under the condition that it has exactly one element if φ holds -in other words, the projection F ( B ) × φ → φ is an isomorphism. We can rephrase the discussion in terms of a certain coequalizer.
For the rest of this subsection, φ is a subobject of 1 in an AU A.
Definition 21 The endofunctor V φ on A is defined on objects U by letting V φ (U ) be the following coequalizer:
This is extended to morphisms in the obvious way.
We shall use the following definition to calculate the equivalence relation corresponding to the epi e.
Definition 22 If U is any object of AX, we define an equivalence relation ∼ It is readily seen that the Boolean algebra B φ defined above is 2/ ∼ 2 φ .
Proposition 23
The equivalence relation for the epi e :
Proof. If (x, * ) ∈ U ×φ then φ holds, so we have i 1 (x) ∼ φ i 2 ( * ). Conversely, Suppose x ∼ φ y with x, y ∈ U + φ. We must show e(x) = e(y). If x = y this is immediate, so we just need to consider the case where φ holds and we have * ∈ φ. Then for every u ∈ U we have
It follows that e(x) = e · i 2 ( * ) for all x ∈ U + φ, so e(x) = e(y).
Lemma 24 Let U be an object of A. Then the following conditions are equivalent.
The projection π
2. The morphism η U = e · i 1 : U → V φ (U ) is an isomorphism.
3. If φ holds then U has exactly one element.
Proof. (1) is just a categorical way of stating (3). We show (2)⇔(3). η U is epi iff, in the case where φ holds, there is some u ∈ U with e · i 1 (u) = e · i 2 ( * ), i.e. i 1 (u) ∼ U +φ φ i 2 ( * ). Under the hypothesis of φ this is just saying that there is some u ∈ U . In other words, η U is epi if φ implies U is inhabited. η U is mono iff, for every u, v ∈ U , we have that
this holds in any case because i 1 is mono. Thus η U is mono iff, in the case where φ holds, we have that u = v for every u, v ∈ U . In other words, η U is mono if φ implies all elements of U are equal. We thus see that η U is iso iff φ implies U has exactly one element.
Proposition 25 V φ preserves finite limits (non-strictly).
Proof. Consider a finite diagram D in A. Given a cone over V φ (D), we have either that φ holds or that the cone is the image of a cone over D. The result follows.
It follows that V φ preserves monics.
Lemma 26 Let m : V → U be a monic in AX.
The pullback of
1. An element of the pullback is a pair (u, e(y)) where u ∈ U , y ∈ V + φ and i 0 (u) ∼ φ (m + φ)(y). If φ holds then e(y) = e · i 2 ( * ), while if i 0 (u) = (m + φ)(y) then (u, e(y)) = (m(v), e · i 1 (v)) for some v ∈ V .
2. This is now clear.
Proposition 27
The functor V φ : A → A is the functor part of a monad whose multiplication is an isomorphism.
Proof. Defining the unit η as in Lemma 24 (2), we show two properties of it.
First,
, we see that if φ holds then every element of U + φ is equivalent under ∼ φ to i 2 ( * ) and so V φ (U ) satisfies condition (3) of the Lemma.
and we must show that (η U + φ)(x) ∼ V φ (U )+φ φ i 1 · e(x). If x = i 1 (u) this follows from the definition of η U , while if x = i 2 ( * ) then φ holds and it follows from the definition of ∼ φ .
Given these, we can define the multiplication µ U as (η V φ (U ) ) −1 . From the second property of η it follows that µ V φ (U ) = V φ (µ U ). The monad properties now follow.
For any monad, the multiplication is an isomorphism iff for each EilenbergMoore algebra the structure map is an isomorphism, its inverse being the unit. The category of Eilenberg-Moore algebras is then equal to the full subcategory of the base category whose objects are those for which the unit is an isomorphism.
It now follows, using Lemma 24, that the category of finitary sheaves over B φ is equivalent to the category of Eilenberg-Moore algebras of the monad V φ . It is a reflective subcategory of AX. Abusing notation slightly, we define Sh(B φ ) to be this reflective subcategory, and write J for the reflection. We also write inc for the inclusion.
Proposition 28 Sh(B φ ) is an AU, and J : A → Sh(B φ ) is an AU functor.
Proof. In general, the AU-structure of Sh(B φ ) is obtained by first taking the corresponding structure in A and then applying J . Given this, it is then clear that J is an AU functor. However, we need to discuss the different kinds of structure in more detail.
The inclusion inc creates limits, so Sh(B φ ) has all finite limits. Since V φ preserve finite limits, so does J . For finite colimits, let D be a finite diagram in Sh(B φ ) and let γ : inc(D) → C be the colimit cocone in A. J , as a left adjoint, preserves all existing colimits, so J (γ) makes J (C) a colimit of J · inc(D) ∼ = D in Sh(B φ ). It follows that Sh(B φ ) has all finite colimits. The other conditions for colimits follow from the fact that J preserves finite limits. because there is a morphism from J (φ) to J (⊥).
Conversely we can define a functor
These functors form an adjoint equivalence. Immediately, J · γ = J · I · inc ∼ = J · inc is naturally isomorphic to the identity. To see that γ · J is naturally isomorphic to the identity we need that γ · J · I ∼ = γ · J = I · V φ is isomorphic to I, which is obvious by construction of V φ . This also shows that γ is an AU functor, since the AU constructions in Sh(B φ ) are calculated by applying V φ to the constructions in A. After that the result follows from Theorem 16.
Subspaces
In this section we examine subspaces and show (Theorem 39) how the open subspaces and closed subspaces generate a Boolean algebra of subspaces that is free over the distributive lattice of subobjects of 1. This result is wholly constructive, but has the important consequence that we can reuse some classical arguments as though we had a Boolean algebra of subobjects of 1 in an AUsee Section 6.
Our treatment is developed from that of [Vic07b] , albeit with substantial changes: the underlying idea is that subspaces of an AS are analogous to inductively generated subtopologies of a formal topology. Interestingly, however, it is dualized, with meets and joins exchanged. This is because of the differing behaviours of two approaches to formal topology. For formal topologies in general, specified by a full cover relation, arbitrary joins of subspaces are easily seen to exist, but meets take more work insofar as they exist at all. On the other hand, for inductively generated formal topologies, specified by an axiom set, meets are easy, while finitary joins exist but take a little more work. [Vic07b] deals with general formal topologies, using joins of subspaces, and then treats inductively generated topologies as a special case. In the present AU setting we do not have a good account of general formal topologies and so are intrinsically in the inductively generated case.
Regarding closed subspaces, one should note that the classical property splits into various inequivalent formulations in constructive point-free topology. We follow the notion of closed subspace as complement of open subspace, using Boolean complementation in a lattice of point-free subspaces. The other notion is that a subspace is closed if it contains all its closure points. This is the notion developed constructively by Sambin in his Basic Picture ( [Sam03] , [Sam11] ) and also leads to definitions such as that of "weakly closed sublocale". The two notions are compared in [Vic07b] .
For locales, a subspace (sublocale) can be understood as given by a family of pairs (φ i , ψ i ) (i ∈ I), where φ i , ψ i are subobjects of 1 in the topos of sheaves. These can be understood as extra relations φ i ≤ ψ i used for presenting the frame, and in terms of points they are extra constraints: a point x of the superlocale is in the sublocale iff, for every i for which φ i is a neighbourhood of x, so too is ψ i . This point of view is systematically taken in [Vic07b] .
We can take a similar approach in arithmetic spaces. (Some other well known characterizations of sublocales from topos theory, for instance as nuclei on frames, do not adapt to the AU setting.) If φ, ψ are subobjects of 1 in the arithmetic universe AX then the subspace for φ ≤ ψ has AU AX[φ → ψ]. We may write X[φ ≤ ψ] or X[φ → ψ] for the corresponding AS. However, the question arises as to what the indexing set I might be. If it is external, then the AU is got by adjoining morphisms for all its elements, obtaining
On the other hand it could be internal in AX, giving two subobjects U and V of I and the subspace AU presented as
It is not clear to us what is going to be the right notion to adopt (and maybe it varies). For the present work we shall take the internal view, which is in line with the philosophy that the infinities one uses should be the ones that can be characterized internally. However, in our present applications I will be a finite cardinal, given by an external natural number, and so there is no essential distinction between the two views.
We can simplify these presentations. Consider the pullback square
If e and f are both monic then so are p and q, and a morphism U → V over I is equivalent to a morphism U → U × I V inverting p. Hence every subspace presented as AX[U ≤ I V ] can equivalently be presented as AX[m −1 ] for some monic m. To put it another way, in considering the presentations using U, I, V , we can without loss of generality take I = U and we invert U ← V . 2 ] over the whole space X. This defines a preorder on the set of monics. We call a subspace of X an equivalence class of monics under ≤, and write Subsp(X) for the poset of subspaces. It is a ∧-semilattice, with m 1 ∧ m 2 defined as the coproduct monic m 1 + m 2 .
Note that if m 1 and m 2 have the same codomain, i.e. they are U ← V i , then the subspace meet for U + U ← V 1 + V 2 agrees with the subobject meet for U ← V 1 ∧ V 2 .
So far our knowledge of the structure of Subsp(X) is rather limited. On the analogy with sublocales (see in particular [Vic07b] ) we would conjecture that it also has finite joins, with (
, and be distributive.
Lemma 31
If AX is an AU with m 1 and m 2 two monics, then
1 ] for the canonical AU functor, we also have
Proof. We write I 2 : AX[m
2 ] for the other canonical AU functors. Then we can define AU homomorphisms
by F ·I 12 = I 2 ·I 1 and G·I 2 = G where the AU homomorphism G : −1 ]. Our main result in this section is to show that the free Boolean algebra over Sub AX (1) (the distributive lattice of subobjects of 1 in AX) embeds in Subsp(X). This, together with Proposition 2, shows that one can use Boolean reasoning in terms of subspaces, and that it is conservative over the coherent reasoning with subobjects.
We write σ(S) for the subspace in X for the monic
(This is well defined, since different enumerations of S give equivalent monics.) By definition σ is a ∧-semilattice homomorphism.
Our aim now is to show that σ(S) ≤ σ(T ) iff S ≤ T as in Proposition 2. In fact we do slightly more, since we show that σ, thus factoring as an embedding BA L (qua DL) ∼ = F(L × L)/ ≤ → Subsp(X), preserves the finite meets and joins of BA L (qua DL) .
For the rest of this section, we fix an AS X and write L for Sub AX (1).
Proof. Combining Propositions 1 and 2 we obtain a ∧-semilattice presentation for F(L × L)/ ≤ as quotient of F(L × L), so it suffices to check that σ respects the relations in Proposition 1. These are all clear.
The difficult part is the converse, essentially because we do not have a general concrete description of AX[m −1 ]. Nor do we have a general way to translate the condition m 1 ≤ m 2 , which is defined in terms external to AX, into an explicit description internal there. However, we can use the representation results of Section 4 to gain some concrete knowledge for the open and closed subspaces and their finite meets and finite joins.
Definition 35 Let X be an AS, and let φ, ψ be subobjects of 1 in AX. Then -
is the open subspace for φ, written as φ;
is the closed subspace for φ, written as X − φ;
is a crescent subspace, and We now exploit Theorem 29 to find information about AX[φ ≤ ⊥].
Proposition 36 Let X be an AS, and let φ, ψ be subobjects of 1 in AX. Then for the crescent (X − φ) ∧ ψ and for any subspace
Proof. (X − φ) ∧ ψ is got by taking the closed subspace for φ × ψ → ψ in AX/ψ, and we calculate that
For our development of a calculus of subspaces, we shall find it convenient to define an action of BA L (qua DL) on Subsp(X), (Y, a) → Y · a (recall that L is the free boolean algebra on Sub AX (1)).
To show that this definition is good, and preserves finite meets, it suffices to check that the function
, respects the relations of the semilattice presentation in Proposition 1. This is straightforward.
We also define the bottom subspace ⊥ as
Lemma 38 If φ and ψ are subobjects of 1, and Y and Z are subspaces, then
Proof. Proposition 36 proves this in the case Y = . The full generality can be proved by working over Y and using Lemma 32.
Theorem 39
1. The action Z · a preserves finite meets in both arguments.
2. For any a ∈ BA L (qua DL) , the function Z → Z · a is right adjoint to the function Y → Y ∧ ⊥ · ¬a.
4. The function a → ⊥ · a is an order isomorphism from BA L (qua DL) to a sublattice of Subsp(X). Meet in Subsp(X) distributes over joins of subspaces of the form ⊥ · a.
Proof. We prove the parts out of order. One half of (1) (that Z · (−) preserves finite meets) is by definition. Of course, this also implies that Z · (−) is monotone.
The first part of (3) (that
, say) and a. Since a can be expressed as a meet of cocrescents, it suffices to consider a = ¬φ ∨ ψ, and then ⊥ · a = X[φ ≤ φ ∧ ψ]. Clearly if we impose this then we also have U × φ ≤ V × φ ∨ U × (φ ∧ ψ), the defining relation for Z · a.
We now prove (2): we must show that
From the adjunction we can deduce that Z → Z · a is monotone (which we did not know initially), and preserves all existing meets in Z. Thus this also completes the proof of (1).
(3) (second part): By applying (2) and preservation of meets
In the case Y = this shows that a → ⊥ · a preserves finite joins; and for general Y it shows that meet distributes over those joins. (Note that we do not know whether the whole of Subsp(X) is a lattice. By analogy with what is known for sublocales [Vic07b] we conjecture that
We now show that the monotone function a → ⊥ · a is an order embedding. Suppose that ⊥ · a ≤ ⊥ · b, i.e.
≤ ⊥ · (¬a ∨ b) using parts (2) and (3). We show that ¬a ∨ b = , for then a ≤ b.
It follows that φ i ≤ ψ i for all i, so ¬φ i ∨ ψ i = and c = .
Corollary 40 Let X be an AS, and let φ, ψ be subobjects of 1 in AX. Then
Corollary 41 Let X be an AS, and let φ be a subobject of 1 in AX. Then amongst subspaces of X, X − φ is a complement of φ.
Proof. From Corollary 40 we see that (X − φ) ∨ φ exists and is X[φ ≤ φ], which is the whole of X. In (X − φ) ∧ φ we have ≤ φ ≤ ⊥, which gives the empty space. This should not come as a surprise. Suppose, for example, we had a similar result for Heyting pretoposes. Then the preservation of exponentials would imply a conservativity theorem of the classical logic of subspaces over the Heyting pretopos one, which would imply that any Heyting pretopos is a boolean one.
An induction principle
We now give an example that, in fact, was the original motivation for the work in this paper. Suppose in an AU AX we have a subobject φ of the natural numbers object N , in other words a predicate φ(n) where n : N . There is an obvious induction principle arising from the fact that N is an initial induction algebra. (An induction algebra is a set -or, more generally, an object of a category -equipped with a constant and a unary operator.) If we have both the base case φ(0) and an induction step (∀n)(φ(n) → φ(n + 1)), then φ as subobject of N is a sub-(induction algebra): it contains 0 and is closed under the successor operation s. It follows by the initiality property of N that there is a unique induction algebra homomorphism f : N → φ and with a little more reasoning one sees that it is inverse to the inclusion φ → N , which is therefore an isomorphism. In other words, we have (∀n)φ(n). Now suppose we have two predicates φ(n) and ψ(n) and we wish to use induction to show (∀n)(φ(n) → ψ(n)). If AX were locally cartesian closed, then we could form an implication formula φ(n) → ψ(n) as subobject of N and use the same argument as above for φ. However, in general an AU is not locally cartesian closed. Surprisingly, we get some clues from classical logic. The formula φ(n) → ψ(n) is classically equivalent to ¬φ(n) ∨ ψ(n), so classically our induction step is (∀n)((¬φ(n) ∨ ψ(n)) → (¬φ(n + 1) ∨ ψ(n + 1))), which reduces to (∀n)(φ(n + 1) → φ(n) ∨ ψ(n + 1)) and (∀n)(φ(n + 1) ∧ ψ(n) → ψ(n + 1)).
These are two sequents that can be interpreted in an AU. Of course, the classical reasoning cannot apply directly to subobjects in the AU. However, we shall show how to exploit the fact that for subspaces we have a Boolean algebra. There we can apply the classical reasoning, and it turns out that the sequents just described are a satisfactory description of the induction step.
Let us examine in more detail what induction principle we might hope for. First, we want a base case φ(0) → ψ(0). Categorically, it appears like this. φ(0) is the subobject 0 * φ of 1 got by pulling φ → N back along the constant 0 : 1 → N :
is similar, and then the base case is the condition that there is a morphism from φ(0) → ψ(0).
Next, we want an induction step (∀n)((φ(n) → ψ(n)) ⇒ (φ(n + 1) → ψ(n + 1))). We have to take care to explain this correctly. Note that the induction hypothesis φ(n) → ψ(n) is not a formula in our arithmetic logicbecause AUs are not locally cartesian closed. But neither is it a sequent or judgement n : N, φ(n) ψ(n), for that would be implicitly universally quantified as (∀n)(φ(n) → ψ(n)), the very thing we are trying to prove. The induction hypothesis amounts to a context in which n has been fixed (generically), and φ(n) → ψ(n) has been hypothesized. In other words, it is a context corresponding to an AU AX[n : N ][φ(n) → ψ(n)]. (This is a slight abuse of notation -"φ" and "ψ" here denote the images of φ and ψ in AX[n : N ].) The induction step is then a construction that shows how in this AU we also have φ(n + 1) → ψ(n + 1), and the induction principle (which we shall prove) says that if we have both the base case and the induction step then, back in AX, we have already (∀n)(φ(n) → ψ(n)) -in other words, a morphism φ → ψ over N .
The induction hypothesis is the subspace
and from this point of view the induction step is to show that it is less than the subspace X[n : N ][φ(n) ≤ ψ(n)]: in other words, by Corollary 40
that is equivalent to two conditions on X[n : N ],
that are equivalent, by Theorem 39, to
These two conditions, in which n : 1 → N is the generic natural number in AX[n : N ], are the induction step rephrased as internal properties of AX[n : N ]. However (Theorem 19), we have concrete knowledge of AX[n : N ] as equivalent to the slice category AX/N , and this enables us to rephrase the conditions again as internal properties of AX. In AX/N we have that 1 is the morphism Id : N → N and N is the projection π 2 : N × N → N . The generic n is the diagonal morphism ∆ : N → N × N . The predicate φ becomes the projection π 2 : φ × N → N . To calculate the truth value (i.e. subobject of 1) φ(n) = n * φ, we calculate this pullback:
It can be calculated using generalized elements as comprising the triples (m, m , m ) such that φ(m ) and (m, m) = (m , m ); and this is just φ. Hence φ(n) as object of the slice is given by the morphism φ → N . Next, φ(n + 1) is got as the pullback
and by similar reasoning we see that this is the pullback s * φ,
The definitions of ψ(n) and ψ(n + 1) are, of course, similar. Thus, when φ(n) etc. are defined this way in AX, we see that the induction step is equivalent to Conditions IS1 and IS2 in AX.
We have now reduced the induction principle to a result about the internal structure of AX, with no reference to AUs presented over it.
Lemma 43 Let X be an AS and let φ and ψ be two subobjects of N in AX. As above, we shall write φ(n) and ψ(n) for φ and ψ, and φ(n + 1) and ψ(n + 1) for their pullbacks along s : N → N . If we have φ(0) ≤ ψ(0) and Conditions IS1 and IS2, then we also have φ ≤ ψ.
Proof. Define A(k) (k : N ) as the subobject of N comprising those j for which j ≤ k and φ(j), ..., φ(k).
In the internal language of an arithmetic universe this amounts to
where π 1 is the lifting of the first projection on lists and [j, . . . , k] is the list of number from j to k.
We define recursively a function f k : A(k) → ψ(k) as follows, with j + k as recursion variant. Of course, f k (j) will always be k but the point is to establish that ψ(k) holds.
If j = k = 0, then we have φ(0) and from the base case we deduce ψ(0) and can take f 0 (0) = 0.
If j = k > 0, we have φ(j). From condition IS1 we deduce φ(j − 1) ∨ ψ(k). In the latter case we define f k (j) = k, and in the former we can recursively define
If j < k, we have φ(k) and recursively calculating f k−1 (j) gives us ψ(k − 1). Now condition IS2 gives us ψ(k).
We can summarize the above discussion in our induction principle.
Theorem 44 (Principle of Sequent Induction) Let X be an AS, and let φ and ψ be subobjects of N in AX. Suppose we have the following two conditions.
1. (Base case) Over X, we have φ(0) ≤ ψ(0).
(Induction step) Over
(this context is the induction hypothesis) we also have φ(n + 1) ≤ ψ(n + 1).
Then φ ≤ ψ holds over X.
Remark 45
With the same technique we can prove an induction principle for list-objects analogous to that of natural numbers.
We can in fact prove the induction principle (over N ) for arbitrary Boolean formulae, corresponding to finite conjunctions of implications i (φ i (n) → ψ i (n)). We might try to prove this by separate inductions, one for each φ i (n) → ψ i (n), but the next Theorem tells us that we can assume all the conditions φ i (n) → ψ i (n) as induction hypotheses when trying to prove φ i (n + 1) → ψ i (n + 1).
Theorem 46 Let X be an AS, and for 1 ≤ i ≤ r let φ i and ψ i be subobjects of N in AX. Suppose we have the following two conditions.
1. (Base case) Over X, we have φ i (0) ≤ ψ i (0) for every i.
(Induction step) Over
Then φ i ≤ ψ i holds over X for every i.
Proof. We sketch the proof, which is similar to that of Lemma 43 but more complicated. By the calculus of subspaces, we can redistribute the induction hypothesis over X[n : N ] as By conservativity, the corresponding condition in AX holds. We must show that, together with the base case, it implies the conclusion. If 1 ≤ i ≤ r and k ∈ N , define A i (k) ⊆ F{1, . . . , r} by (F ) as follows. From F ∈ A i (k + 1) we have ∅ ∈ A j (k) for all j ∈ F . By recursion on k, from f k j (∅) we deduce ψ k j for all j ∈ F and hence φ i (k + 1) ∧ j∈F ψ j (k), and then our induction step (with I = F, J = {1, . . . , r} − F ) gives us either ψ i (k + 1), as required, or φ j (k) for some j / ∈ F . Recursing on |{1, . . . , r} − F |, we can use a recursive call to f k+1 i (F ∪ {j}). From this we can deduce φ i (k) → ψ i (k) for all i and k: for if we have φ i (k) then we can use f k i (∅).
Application: locatedness of Dedekind sections
Corresponding to the localic form of the real line (see, e.g., [Joh82] ) there is a propositional geometric theory whose models are real numbers. However, it is even more transparent to express it as a predicate theory of Dedekind sections. It uses the rationals as a sort, but since the set of rationals can be constructed geometrically out of nothing the theory is essentially propositional. This is discussed in [Vic07a] . In this form, with no infinitary disjunctions, the theory -including the construction of Q -can be modelled in AUs. Thus the finitary algebra of AUs deals with countably infinitary disjunctions in the logic. The signature has two unary predicates L and R on the rationals, so a model comprises two subsets L and R of Q. They are disjoint, and both inhabited; and L is rounded lower and R rounded upper. Those conditions can be expressed as follows. (Note that from these we can deduce that if L(q) and R(r) then q < r.)
There is a further "locatedness" condition. As expressed in [Joh82] , it says that L and R come arbitrarily close:
(∀ε : Q)(ε > 0 → (∃q, r : Q)L(q) ∧ R(r) ∧ r − q < ε)
or, alternatively, (∀q, r : Q)(q < r → L(q) ∨ R(r)).
All these are compatible with the type theory for AUs, and so syntactic categories AR can be constructed for them. However, the question arises as to whether the two conditions (1) and (2) are still equivalent when one works with AUs, for the proof that the second implies the first is non-trivial. One uses induction on n to prove a lemma that, given q, r and ε with L(q), R(r) and ε > 0, then r − q < 2 n ε → (∃q , r : Q)L(q ) ∧ R(r ) ∧ r − q < ε.
The base case, r − q < ε, is immediate. Now suppose it is true for n, and r − q < 2 n+1 ε. Define s i = q + i(r − q)/4 (0 ≤ i ≤ 4), so s 0 = q and s 4 = r, so we already have L(s 0 ) and R(s 4 ). Applying condition (2) twice, we have both L(s 1 ) ∨ R(s 2 ) and L(s 2 ) ∨ R(s 3 ), which implies R(s 2 ) ∨ L(s 2 ) ∨ (L(s 1 ) ∧ R(s 3 )). For the three disjuncts respectively we can replace (q, r) by (s 0 , s 2 ), (s 2 , s 4 ) or (s 1 , s 3 ), halving the difference r − q, and apply induction.
To use this to show that (2) implies (1), suppose we are given ε > 0. We can find some q and r with L(q) and R(r), and then some n with r − q < 2 n ε. Then the lemma gives us the conclusion we want.
In toposes, with their function types, the inductively proved implication in the lemma is not a problem. For AUs we must use Theorem 44. Let us take R now to mean the AS defined for the theory of reals with (2), and let R[ε > 0] be got by adjoining a positive rational ε. Take φ(n) to be the formula (∃q, r : Q)(L(q) ∧ R(r) ∧ r − q < 2 n ε), and ψ(n) the formula (∃q , r : Q)(L(q ) ∧ R(r ) ∧ r − q < ε) (which in fact does not use n). The induction step described as part of the geometric reasoning to use a non-geometric but topos-valid proof so long as the result could be stated geometrically.
The results in this paper are a first step towards filling that gap between topos-valid geometric reasoning and AU-valid ("arithmetic") reasoning. We have proved the problematic induction principle and others, and also established a significant part of the localic technology of complementable subspaces as well as proving some particular cases of the structure theorems that are taken for granted in classifying toposes.
Our methods are constructive throughout. In fact, we conjecture that, because of the way they use universal algebra, they are themselves valid in the sense of arithmetic reasoning.
Our algebraic approach to extending an AU by adjoining additional structure S was crude, though sufficient for our purposes. It seems clear that a general account should deal with dependent type theory, developing the techniques of [Mai05a] .
We also conjecture that the Boolean algebra of subspaces that we have identified provides a technical tool for studying how one might embed an AU in a Boolean pretopos (using results of [MR10] ) or even a Boolean AU.
